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19,1950.)

RALPH M. DAVENPORT, as Administrator, etc., et at,
Appellants, v. THE DAVENPORT FOUNDATION (a
Corporation) et at, Respondents.
[1] Trusts-Valldit)'-8ecret Intent.-A trust was not invalid on
the grouud that it was not intended to be operative during the
trustor's life, where the declaration of trust was a tripartite
agreement between him, Ii board of trustees, and a beneficial')'
college whi~ received payments from the trust, and operated
under the terms of the declaration, and there was no showing
that the college understood that the agreement was not to
be operative, since any secret intent of the other parties
that the declaration should not be presently operative would
be immaterial.
[Sa, 2b] Id.-ActioDB to Decla.re Trusts Invalid-NoDB1lit.-In Ul
action to irlvalidate a trust ab suspending the power of alienation in perpetuity, and as not being wholly charitable, the
court erred in granting a nonsuit, where there was evidence
which would support findings in favor of plaintiffs that a
primary purpose of the trustor was to provide for his descendants whether or not they were living at the time the declaration
was executed, where a severability clause in the declaration was
not effective to eliminate the invalid powers, and where the
statute of limitations did not bar the action.
[S] Id.-ConstructioD.-The practical construction placed on •
declaration of trust during its administration by a board of

[3] See 6 Oal.Jur. 304; 25 Oal.Jur. 295; 12 Am.Jur. 787.
Kelt. Dig. References: [1] Trusts, § 53; [2, 6] Trusts, § 70;
[3] Trusts, 1164; [4, 8] Trusts, § 75; [6] Trusts, 1365; [7]
Trusts, § 50.
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trustees and the trustor for a period before bis death wu:~
entitled to great weight in its interprl'tation thereafter.
,:'
Id.-Validity-Partial Invalldity.-Assuming that a paragraph 3
in a declaration of trust authorized the trustees to apply certain'"
trust income for the beneOt of the trustors relat;ves whetbf'T
or not in being at the trust's ereation, or for charitable pur- \
poses, the invalid and valid powers would be so inseparably,~
blended that the whole paragraph would fail, despite a severa- '.:
bility clause having essentially the same dect as Prob. Code,-,
1101.
Id.~tatute of LimttatioDS.-An action to invalidate a trust'
on the ground, among others, that it attempt.ed an invalid;:
restraint on alienation, was not barred by the statute of limitations, where the trustees did not repudiate the trust, although
they may have intended to hold under the express rather
than the resulting trust arising on its failure, since with respect
to the statute such trustees are treated as voluntary rather than
as involuntary trustees until repudiation, and the statute does
not begin to run in their favor until such time.
,/
Id.-Actions to Declare Trust Invalid-Review.-The defen.. :
that plaUlti1fs were estopped by laches from' bringing an action.'
to invalidate a trust could Dot properly be considered on the '
review of a judgment of nonsuit.
ld.-Transactions Operating as 'l'rusts-Deposits of MonQ"":-,i
In an action to 'invalidate an alleged trust in a bank account,,,
the court was justified in concluding that a trust arose when;
a trustor of a foundation opened the account with another, '.
and that such other beeJl.mf! the trusrtee of the aeeount, although
a document executed by the trustor, directing the foundation
to set apart for certain purposes funds derived from' the
account, was in the future tense, where he had expressed his
wish that the foundation should immediately become the
trustee, the opening of the account was a sub~tjtute scheme,
and the use of the future tense was not inconsistent with the !
present creation of a trust.
.
Id.-Valldity-Partial Invalidity.-In an action to invalidate'
a trust creating a foundation, and to invalidate a trust estab-.
lished by the opening of a joint bank account which created'
a remainder interest therein in the foundation, an invalidation!
of the foundation trust would not affect the validity of the life;
interests in the bank account trust, where the remainder and
life interests were not inseparably blended.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Loa.
Angeles County. David Coleman, Judge. Judgment modified and affirmed iii part. and reversed in part.
[6] See 16 Oa.LJur. 428; 64 Am.Jur. 229.
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Action to have two trusts declared invalid. Judgment of
nonsuit as to one trust. reversed; judgment for defendants
88 to other trust, modified and affirmed.

R. R. Colby and Joseph D. Taylor for Appellants.
Allard, BroWDsberger. Shelton & O'Connor, Joseph A.
Allard. Jr .• L. A. Shelton, Brady & Nossaman and Walter L.
NOSRaman for Respondents.
TRAYNOR. J.-On May 23. 1939. Levi M. Davenport, then
78 years of a~e. conveyed certain property to La Verne CoIIrl!'(>. 8 corporation. as trustee. The trustee was given only
ministerial duties. The management of the trnst, to be knOWD
as the .. Davenport Foundation." was committed to a board
of directors of fivE' nampd pt'rsons who were to constitute the
board of trustees of the Foundation. The trust provided:
"REsERVES
"Before distribution is made of any of the net in~me
reserves shall be set aside as follows to wit:
"(1) 25% of the gross income for taxes,supervISion and
upkeep.
.. (2) 12% of ~e gross income for replacements and
betterments.
.. D1STRIBUTION OF INCOXB

.. All the net income available for distribution .hall be paid

in monthly installments. as follows:
.. (1) To the Trustor, Levi M. Davenport, the IIUID of
l'-'our Hundred Dollars ($400.00) per month, for and during
the term of his natural life.
"(2) To La Verne College. a corporation, the sum of
'l'hret' Hundred Dollars ($300.00) per month for the purpose
of establishing a department of PHILOSOPHY and RELIGION,
which department shall be established at the beginniDg of
thr school year 1939-1940.
.. (3) To make suitable and proper provisions for the
Sllpport and maintenance of J. R. Davenport, my brother,
all his needs may require, not to exceed however, One Hundred
Dollars ($100.00) per month. all of which shall be at the
Ilole discretion of the Board of Trustees. In the ('Vent that
any of my children should come to want. the Board of Trustees shall use a· portion of ihe income to care for them in
80 far as their needs may require, alJ of which shall be solely
lritbin &be disc.retion of the Board of Trustees.

)

\

'10

DATBNPOBT tI. DA'BNPOBT FOUNDATION

{86 O.2d

H (4')
To American Bible Society, with its principal oflice
at Bible House, New York City, the sum of Three Hundred,
Dollars ($300.00), per annum, payable annually at the discretion of the Board.
"(5) To the payment of annuities in such amounts u
may be agreed upon between the Board of Trustees and the
annuitants, who may add to this Trust.
•• (6) All of the rest and residue of andistributed income
shall be used by the Board of Trustees for such purpOsel
consistent with the purposes of this trust· as may be determined in the sole discretion of said Board of Trustees."
The trust then specified in detail the type of religiOlll
education that should be provided at La Verne College and
the manner in which successors to the board of trustees should
be selected. The trustees had to subscribe to certain enumerated religious beliefs, and the Elders Body of the Church
of the Brethren was given power over their selection and removal. The declaration of trust conferred usual adfninis.
trative powers on the board of trustees and also provided:
"Others may add to this Foundation, provided the addi- ':
tional income shall be used in maintaining the Doctrines and
Principles of our church, as herein set forth, provided how..ever, that the donor may reserve a portion of sucJJ. income;
for himself or herself, or for relatives during his, her, or·'
their lifetime. • . .
.
"In the event that any provision or provisions of this t,.
instrument are or are adjudged to be for any reason unen- '
forceable the remainder' hereof, disregarding such provisioDl,
shall subsist and be carried into effect.
•• This trust may not be revoked nor, except as otherwise .,
herein provided may any of th6 corpus of the trust estate .
be withdrawn."
The Davenport Foundation was incorporated in 1940, and
title to the property held by La Verne College that had been '
conveyed to it by the trustol was deeded to the Davenport
Foundation.
Levi M. Davenport died January 6, 1947, and this action
was then commenced by the administrator of his estate and
his heirs to have the trust declared invalid and the property
distributed to them. The complaint also stated a cause of
action' to have an alleged trust in a bank account declared
invalid. This cause of action raises distinct issues and will
be treated separately.
Plain~ attack the validiV of the trust, Drat Oil the Il'OUJUl

)
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that its provisions suspend the power of alienation of the
trust corpus in perpetuity and that its purposes are not
wholJy charitable. and secondly on the ground that the
declaration of trust was not intended to be operative during
the lifetime of the trustor and is therefore void as an
attempted testamentary disposition. Defendants contend,
however, that the noncharitable provisions are operative only
for a period measured by lives in being, that the declaration
of trll!';t is nontestamentary in character, and that in any
evenT plainti1fs' cause of action is barred by the statute of
limitations. At the close of plaintiffs' case the trial court
granted a nonsuit as to the causes of action attacking the
validity of the declaration of trust establishing the Davenport Foundation. It is necessary to determine, therefore,
whether there is evidence in the record that would support
findings in plaintiffs' favor on the question of the validity
of the trust, and if so whether their action is barred by the
statute of limitations.
The declaration of trust provided that Davenport should
receive $400 per month and the use of his home rent free
during his lifetime. The board of trustees were given power
to consult with Davenport and absolved of any responsibility
for loss resulting from following his requests, recommendations or advice. Plaintiffs do not contend that the reservations of these interests in the trustor would render the trust
im'alid as an attempted testamentary disposition (see.
Tennant v. John Tennant Memorial Home, 167 Cal. 570.
576, 578-579 [140 P. 242]; Restatement, Trusts, § 361).
They contend. however, that there is evidence in the record
that would support a finding that the trustor did not intend
the declaration of trust to be operative at all during his
lifetime. They rely on the facts that the trustees appointed
Davenport manager of the Foundation and allowed him to
deal with the property in the same manner after the declaration of trust was executed as he had before. These facts,
they contend, will support an inference that it was understood
between Davenport and the trustees that the trust was not
to become operative during his lifetime. They rely on the
rule thnt parol evidence is admissible to prove that a document was not intended to take effect until the happening of
a condition precedent. (See, P. A. Smith Co. v. Mulle,.,
20] Cal. 219, 222 [256 P. 411].)
[1] Plaintiffs' contention overlooks the fact, however, that

I
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the declaration of trust constituted a tripartite agreement
among Davenport, the board of trustees, and La Verne College. There is no evidence that La Verne College understood I
that the declaration of trust was not intended to be presently ,
operative. It was a party to the declaration of trust and
operated under its terms. It received the paymeuts provided
for it and used the money according to the directions set forth
in the declaration of trust. Under these circumstances, any
secret intent of Davenport and the trustees that the declaration of trust should not be presently operative would be immaterial. (Brant v. California Dairies, Inc., 4 Ca1.2d 128,
133-134 [48 P.2d 13]; Watson v. Peyton, 10 Cal.2d 156, 158
[73 P.2d 906].) Accordingly, plaintiffs' contention that the
trust is invalid because it was not intended to be operative
during the trustor 's lif~time cannot be sustained.
The parties agree that an irrevocable trust, although partially charitable. is invalid to the extent that under its terms
the trustees may appJy the inCODl~ or corpus to noncharitable
purposes after the lapse of the statutory period of lives in
being or 25 years from its creation. (Civ. Code, §§ 715, 716;
Estate of Sutro, 155 Cal. 727, 734-736 [102 P. 920]; see,
Restatement, Trnsts, § 398.) The only express statem~l!~ of
the purposes of the Davenport trust are found in the six
paragraphs dealing with the distribution of income. The
first of these, $400 per month to the trustor for life, presentS
no problem since the payments terminate on the trustor's
death. The second and fourth are concededly charitable and 1
hence valid, although the payments may continue beyond the_
statutory period. The parties' conflicting contentions with
respect to the correct interpretation of the other paragraphs
may be briefly summarized.
The third paragraph provides for payments to the children
of the trustor. If the word "children" includes children
who might be born after the creation of the trust, this paragraph would permit distribution of income for noncharitable
purposes for longer than the statutory period. Defendants
contend, however, that in view of the advanced age of the
trustor the word "children '; may properly be interpreted as
referring only to then living children. (See, Restatement,
Property, § 243, illus. 4.)
1'he fifth paragraph provides for the payment of annuities
to persons who may add to the trust. Plaintiffs contend that
nnder this paragraph the trustees could use income from the
original trust corpus to pay annuitants who later contributed _~

1
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to the trust but who were not yet in being at the time of ita
creation. Defendants, on the other hand, contend that paragraph five is governed by the later provision providing that
"Others may add to this Foundation, provided the additional
income shall be used in maintaining the Doctrines and Principles of our church, as herein set forth, provided however,
that the donor may reserve a portion of such income for
himself or herself, or for relatives during his, her, or their
lifetime. " As so limited, they contend paragraph five only
provides for the later creation of separate trusts whose noncharitable purposes will terminate within lives in being at the
time of their creation.
Paragraph six provides that .. All of the rest and residue
of undistributed income shall be used by the Board of Trustees for such purposes consistent with the purposes of this
trust as may be determined in the sole discretion of said
Board of Trustees." Plaintiffs contend that under this
paragraph income could be used for any purpose consistent
with the purposes of the foregoing five paragraphs. They
contend that payments to descendants or other relatives of
the trustor born after the creation of the trust would be for
a purpose consistent with payments to himself or his brother
or his children. Thlfs under their interpretation the trustees
would have power under paragraph six to devote income to
non charitable purposes for longer than the statutory period.
Defendants, on the other hand, contend that when the instrument is read as a whole it is clear that the words "purposes
consistent with the purposes of this trust" can properly be
construed as meaning only purposes consistent with the religious purposes of the trust. They rely on the extensive
provisions dealing with the type of religious education to be
provided at La Verne and the religious qualifications required
of the trustees. They also point out that income from tha
property of others who add to the trust must be used to
"maintain the Doctrines and Principles of our church."
[2a] It would serve no purpose, however, to attempt to
resolve these conflicting contentions from an examination of
th£' declaration of trust standing by itself. The record contains relevant extrinsic evidence bearing on the question of
interpretation that would support findings in favor of plaintiffs on at least some of their contentions. [3] The trust
Was administered by the trustees with the assistance of the
trustor for eight years before his death. The practical con-

\
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struction they placed upon the document is entitled to great
weight in its interpretation. (Woodbine v. Van Horn,
29 Ca1.2d 95, 104 [173 P.2d 17].) [2b] The most cogentevidence that a primary purpose of the trustor was to provide
for descendants of his, whether or not they were living at the .
time the declaration of trust was executed, is the fact that an
agreement was executed by the trustor and trustees whereby .
one of the trustor's grandchildren was to receive $100 per .
montb for life after the death of her mother. Given fullweight the execution of this agreement would sustain a finding
ihat under paragraph six the trustees had power to devot!'
income to noncharitable purposes after the statutory period
bad run. Granting a motion for nonsuit was therefore erroneous unless the severability clause may be given effect to
eliminate the invalid powers or the statute of limitations bars
plaintiffs' action. We have concluded that the severability
clause may not be given such broad effect and that the statute
of limitations does not bar the action.
I'
[4] The trust provision that "In the event that any provision or provisions of this instrument are or are adjudged
to be for any reason unenforceable the remainder hereof, .disregarding such provisions, shall subsist and be carried
into effect" states essentially the same rule as that laid down
in Probate Code, section 101. That section provides that
"Where {tbe testator'sl intention cannot have effect to its"
full extent, it must have effect as far as possible." Under its
terms the rule bas bf'en established that" 'valid trusts should
not be disregarded because in the instrument creating them .
one particular invalid tru~t is df'clared, unless the latter is .
so inseparably blended with the others that it cannot be l
eliminated without destroying the main intent of the trustor,
or working manifest injustice to the other beneficiaries.'"
(Estate of Micheletti. 24 Ca1.2d 904, 909 [151 P.2d 833].)
It is assumed for the purposes of applying this rule in reviewing the judgment of nonsuit that under paragraph six the
trustor intended the trustees to have discretion to apply the
remainder of the income for the benefit of relatives of his,
whether in being or not at the time of the creation of the
trust, or for charitable purposes. The choice is stated to be
in the sole discretion of the trustees. Under these circumstances the valid and invalid powers under paragraph six are
inseparably blended and the whole paragraph must fail.
(Estate of 8utro, 155 Cal. 727, 734-735 [102 P. 920J; Estat,
~ Kline, 138 Cal.App. 514, 520 [32 P.2d 677); Edat, oj

~,:
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Vance, 11B Cal.App. 163, 164-165 [4 P.2d 977].) Since the
nonsuit must therefore be reversed, no purpose would be
served by attempting to determine at this time in the absence
of findings based upon all the evidence the extent to which
other provisions of the trust may be severable from the invalid
provisions, if any. (See, Restatement, Trusts, § 39B.)
[5] To the extent that the express trust may be found to
have failed because of an invalid restraint on alienation,
La: Verne College and its successor trustee, the Davenport
Foundation, will have held the legal title to the property on a
resulting trust for the trustor and his heirs. (See, Bainbridge
v. Stoner, 16 Ca1.2d 423, 428 [106 P.2d 423].) Defendants do
not dispute the rules that ordinarily the trustee of a resulting
trust is considered a voluntary trustee and that the statute
of limitations does not begin to run in favor of a voluntary
trustee until he repudiates the trust. (See, Berniker v.
Berniker, 30 Ca1.2d 439, 447·448 [182 P.2d 557J.) They
contend, however. that in this case the trustees were involuntary resulting trustees because they intended to hold under
the express trust rather than under the resulting trust. They
thus seek to distinguish the purchase money resulting trust
cases where the trnstee not only voluntarily holds in trust
but intends to hold for the resulting beneficiary. It is generally held, however, that' it is immaterial whether the trustee
intends to hold for the resulting beneficiary or for the intended
beneficiary of the invalid express trust. With respect to the
statute of limitations, he is treated as a voluntary trustee so
long as he does not repudiate the trust. (See, 3 Scott on
Trusts, § 409, pp. 2]73-2]74; 1 Nossaman, Trust Administration and Taxation, § 117, pp. 111-113, and eases cited.)
Any other rule would allow a trustor to evade prohibitions
against restraint of alienation and perpetuities by establishing
an invalid trust and merely refraining from attacking it until
the statute of limitations bad run.
Defendants contend, however, that the cases of Page v.
Page, 143 Cal. 602 [77 P. 452], and Mackenzie v. LOR AngeZe&
Trust etc. Bk., 39 Cal.App. 247 (178 P. 557], establish the rule
in California thAt in the case of a resulting trust arising
because of the failure of an express trust, as distinct from the
cas!' of a purchase money rel'll1Jting trust, no repudiation is
necessary to start the statute of limitations running in favor
of the trnste!'. The baRis of the decision in thf' Page case is
bot entirely clear, and the statement relied upon in the

\
\
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Mackenzie case is dictum. Neither of these cases has been
followed by later decisions of the California courts that have
consistently classified resulting trusts of both types as voluntary trusts for the purposes· of the statute of limitations.
(Steiner v. Amsel, 18 Ca1.2d 48, 54-55 [112 P.2d 635];
Bainbridge v. Stoner, 16 Ca1.2d 423, 428-429 [106 P.2d 423] ;
see, Ruddick v. Albertson, 154 Cal. 640, 643 [98 P. 1045].)
Thus to the extent that they are inconsistent with the generally prevailing rule, the Page and Mackenzie cases- must be
deemed to have been overruled. Since defendants never
repudiated the trust, plaintiffs' action is not barred by the
statute of limitations.
[6] On the basis of facts pleaded in their answer defendants finally contend that plaintiffs are estopped by laches
from bringing this action. They contend that La Verne
College has seriously changed its position in reliance on the
validity of the trust. This defense may not properly be
considered in reviewhig the judgment of nonsuit, ...flnd in any
event it would be obviated if on retrial it were determined
that the provisio:::ls for the benefit of the college are severable
from the remainder of the trust.
Shortly before his death Davenport decided that he should
make some provision for ten or twelve nephews and nieces.
He considered the possibility of adding $10,000 to the Foundation and giving the trustees discretionary power to provide
up to $1,000 for each nephew or niece if he or she should
have special need for it. Instead, however, on November 23,
1946, he went to his bank with defendant Steinour, treasurer
of the Foundation, to make arrangements with the bank to
hold an account he had in such a way that Stein our could
dispose of it after his death for the benefit of the nieces and
nephews and the Foundation. An officer of the bank told
Davenport that the bank could take no responsibility and
suggested that Davenport open a joint account with a person
whom he trusted to carry out his wishes. Davenport then
transferred the money in his account into a joint account in
his and Steinour's names. After he and Steinour left the
bank, Davenport executed the following document:
"11-23-46
"I am directing the Davenport Foundation Inc. to set
apart funds sufficient to hold $1000.00 in the interest of the
fol1owing-: rT;i8t of 12 relativeR of Davenport.]
"TbilS $1000.00 for each shall be set apart from funda

1
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derived from a personal bank account now in the SecurityFirst National Bank at 230 Ea. Colorado St. Pasadena, Calif.
"The purpose is to have this, $1000.00 to be a part of
Foundation except that if any of tliese above named persons
are in special need, he or she shall appeal for a portion to
the $1000. to their interest, and the Foundation may allot
to such person for their need from this personal fund.
"Signed L. M. Davenport."
The trial court did not grant a nonsuit on the cause of
action by which plaintiffs sought to secure title to the joint
bank account, but at the close of the trial made findings in
defendants' favor. The court found that in opening the
joint account and executing the directive Davenport created
a trust of which Steinour was trustee. The beneficiaries were
the named relatives during their lifetimes and thereafter the
Davenport Foundation. The purpose of the trust was to
provide funds for the named relatives if they should be in
need and to add to the assets of the Foundation. The Foundation, however, filed a disclaimer of any interest in the fund.
[7] Plaintiffs contend that no trust was created because
Daven.P9nJ~jdpot int~~d a trust to arise until after his death ;
that he merel, appointed Steinour his agent to carry out· his
wishes after his death. They rely on the use of the future
tense in the directive to· show that no trust was created at
the time of its execution. There was substantial evidence,
however, to support an inference that by opening the joint
account Davenport effectively created the trust. He had
expressed his wish that the Foundation should immediately
become the trustee. Opening the joint account was a substitute scheme adopted because of uncertainty over the tax
consequences of giving the money directly to the Foundation.
The use of the future tense in the directive is not inconsistent
with the present creation of a. trust of which Steinour was
trustee. Steinour wished to have directions in writing as to
What his duties should be. The directive indicated that the
Foundation should become the trustee when the bank account
was transferred to it. It does not compel the conclusion that
no trust was to arise until that transfer was made. Accordingly, the trial court was justified in concluding that a trust
arose when the joint bank account was opened.
[8] Plaintiffs also contend, however, that the remainder
interest in the Foundation is void because the declaration of
trust setting up the Foundation is invalid for the reasons

)

/

PmBoVICU 6.

Om

OF ABCADL\

[36 C.2d

discussed above. They contend that because the remainder
interest is void the whole trust in the bank account must fail
and that the invalidity cannot be cured by the disclaimer of
its interest by the. Foundation. It is clear, however, that I
~e interests created in the life beneficiaries are severable from
the remainder. Thus even if the Foundation trust should be :
found to be wholly or partially invalid it would not affect
the validity of the life interests. The life interests and the
remainder are not inseparably blended. The invalid interest'
may be eliminated without destroying the main intent of the
trustor or working injustice to other beneficiaries. Aecordingly, under the rule set forth in Estate of Micheletti, 24
Cal.2d 904, 909 [151 P.2d 833], the trust in the bank account
must be sustained to the extent it provides for the named·,
beneficiaries.
\
Since defendant Davenport Foundation filed a disclaimer
of any interest in the fund, the judgment should be modified
to award the remainder interest in the joint bank' account
to the' heirs at law of Levi M. Davenport. As so modified
that part of the judgment adjudicating the disposition of
the joint bank account is aftlrmed. In all other respects the
judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Cartel', J., and
Spence, J., concurred. Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment.
I
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